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IS UGANDA'S "NO-PARTY" SYSTEM
DISCRIMINATORY AGAINST WOMEN
AND A VIOLATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of colonialism, democratic governments have re-
cently been established in many African countries. Under the
watchful- eye of the international community, these couhtries
have frequently taken steps to address widespread allegations
of human rights abuses and discrimination, including estab-
lishing and amending their constitutions and participating in
various international conventions and treaties. While these
documented efforts made by African nations to eliminate dis-
crimination are commendable, it is crucial to ensure that the
action taken is actually implemented and enforced.
Uganda is a prime example of an African state that has rati-
fied various human rights treaties and established a democ-
ratic election process and universal suffrage in its constitution.!
The international community has acknowledged Uganda for
taking such measures, but questions whether these provisions
have been implemented as they should be.'
Enactment of laws or constitutional provisions for the domes-
tic implementation of international obligations is an important
first step in conforming with the treaties a state is party to,3
1. See UGANDA CONST. ch. 4; Angela M. Wakhweya, Women's Health and
Human Rights in Uganda: To Be or Not to Be, That Is the Question!, in THE
CHALLENGES OF WOMEN'S ACTrviSM AND HUMAN RIGHTs IN AFRICA 266, 270
(Diana Fox & Naima Hasci eds., 1999) (commenting that Uganda has ratified
all the major international instruments that claim greater attention to the
role of women in society).
2. See Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy, the Movement System
and Political Repression in Uganda, at http'/www.hrw.org/reports/1999/
Uganda (1999) [hereinafter Hostile to Democracy].
3. See U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Strategy for an Era of Application of
International Law - Action Plan, at http'/untreaty.un.org/ola-
intemetlactionplan.htm (last visited May 20, 2002) [hereinafter Action
Plan].
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but this is not enough to satisfy the state's duty under interna-
tional law.4 States must ensure that the domestic laws that
have been established to implement international law are com-
plied with and properly enforced.5 To that effect, the United
Nations has drafted an Action Plan, providing states and UN
departments with advisory guidelines to aid and ensure states'
compliance with international law. As stated in the Action
Plan:
Just because a national legal system contains rules which are
designed to ensure the implementation of the State's obliga-
tions under international law does not mean that those obli-
gations will be complied with. Those rules of national law
need themselves to be observed. In particular, they need to
be implemented in a manner consistent with the State's in-
ternational obligations.6
In determining whether Uganda is complying with its obliga-
tions under international law, it is necessary to determine the
international law by which Uganda must abide.
International legal scholars now recognize the emergence of
a right or entitlement to democracy among members of the in-
ternational community.7 This entitlement includes the right of
equal access to political participation for men and women,8 be-
cause discrimination against women undermines a state's de-
mocratic framework.9 The right has been drawn from custom-
ary law and a collection of treaties and decisions by various
international organizations, including the UN."0 The most sig-
nificant of these documents, for the arguments set forth here, is
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some Interna-
tional Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449 (1997), available at
http://www.ejil.org/journalVol8/No3/art5.html.
8. See General Assembly Seeks Further United Nations Contribution to
Countries in Transition Moving Towards Democracy, U.N. GAOR Press Re-
lease, U.N. Doc. GA/9359 (1997).
9. Id.
10. See U.N. CHARTER; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, Res., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), which has codified equal political access into inter-
national law." Though international law has been widely criti-
cized as being difficult, if not impossible to enforce, the ICCPR
has set forth enforcement mechanisms for its provisions."
In countries like Uganda, where women have traditionally
lagged far behind men in taking active political roles and even
voting, action must be taken to ensure compliance with inter-
national law. Uganda has taken the beginning steps of abiding
by its obligations as a signatory to the ICCPR by including
numerous equal rights provisions in its Constitutibn.13 But this
is not enough under international law to satisfy the ICCPR's
requirement that, "States Parties ... undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and
political rights set forth in the present Covenant."4 The provi-
sions set out in Uganda's Constitution must actually be imple-
mented to conform to the ICCPR and the Constitution itself.
Despite wording in Uganda's Constitution elevating women
to a political standing equal to that of men, this Note argues
that Uganda has not taken the necessary implementation
steps, particularly permitting a multi-party system. Without
implementation, Uganda has defied its own Constitution and
international law. It is important to note that Uganda is not
alone in this respect. To set forth a clear example, the remarks
of this Note are tailored solely to Uganda, but a similar discus-
sion could be applied to many recent democracies or developing
nations in Africa and around the world. Uganda was selected
as an excellent example because of its willingness to make im-
provements regarding the treatment of women.'5
Part II of this Note will begin by summarizing the relevant
background information on Uganda, including data regarding
the country itself and the Constitutional provisions relevant to
the discussion. Part III will discuss the legal theory that has
evolved regarding a right to democracy and equal political par-
11. See ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 25.
12. Id. arts. 40, § 1, 41, § 1(a)-(b).
13. See UGANDA CONST. ch. 4.
14. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 3.
15. Uganda has a progressive Constitution including an affirmative action
plan establishing quotas for women holding public office. See UGANDA CONST.
art. 78, § 1(b).
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ticipation. This discussion will include a summary of several
international legal documents that have codified the legal the-
ory into international law, creating Uganda's obligation to in-
clude certain rights when its Constitution was drafted. Next,
in Part IV, the Note argues that the "no-party" system in
Uganda fails to give women equal political access, which vio-
lates both Uganda's Constitution and international law. As
will be discussed, international law is also violated by failure to
allow freedom of association and assembly. The Note will con-
clude in Part V with a discussion on how the international
community can enforce the international law provisions vio-
lated by Uganda.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Physical and Political Structure of Uganda
Located in East Africa, Uganda is a small nation roughly the
size of Oregon. 6 Uganda achieved its independence from the
United Kingdom in 1962, but did not adopt its present-day
English common law system and Constitution until 1995."7 The
period between Uganda's independence and the ratification of
the current Constitution was a tumultuous period of dictator-
ship and guerilla war. 8 The era was typified by Idi Amin's vio-
lent rule from 1971-1979. Amin's reign was characterized by
atrocious human rights violations resulting in a death toll of
between 300,000 and 500,000 civilians 9 and the arbitrary ar-
rest and torture of many others.0
16. See Cental Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000 - Uganda,
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbooklgeos/ug.html (2000) [hereinaf-
ter The World Factbook 2000].
17. It is interesting to note that a Constituent Assembly, with several
female members, worked to create the new constitution. The women in the
Assembly formed a "Women's Caucus" and fought successfully for gender-
neutral language and an enhanced affirmative action progress for an increase
of the number of women in Parliament, among other accomplishments. See
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GOOD
GOVERNANCE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES 59-60 (2000), available at
http://magnet.undp.org.
18. See The World Factbook 2000, supra note 16.
19. Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia, Amin, Idi, at
http://encarta/msn.com (2001); Government of Uganda, Biography of Idi
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Also, Uganda is a poor, developing country and is ranked 141
out of 165 states in the UN's most recent Human Development
Report.2' Despite this, the country's standing has improved in
recent years and has even received praise from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). 22  Nicholas
Stern, the Chief Economist of the World Bank, recently re-
marked that Uganda's sustained levels of development and
achievement in economic management are most impressive.3
In 1996, Uganda held its first popular presidential election
since achieving independence, resulting in the election of Lieu-
tenant General Yoweri Katunga Museveni, who remains Presi-
dent today following re-election in 2001.24 President Museveni
has received much praise for his progressive determination and
vision, and his improvement of Uganda's economic situation,'
but one major source of criticism to many is Uganda's prohibi-
tion against political parties.26
B. Uganda's "No-Party" System
Uganda claims to operate under a no-party system with one
recognized political organization, the National Resistance
Movement ("NRM"), to which all Ugandans belong.27 The or-
ganization, maintains President. Museveni, who is also its
chairman, is not a political party but a movement that garners
the support of all Ugandans.' The NRM has often been ac-
Amin Dada, at http'//www.uganda.co.ug/miUenium/amin.htm (last visited
May 20, 2002).
20. See Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2.
21. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001,
at 143 (2001) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001].
22. Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2.
23. Ugandan President Hails World Bank's Support, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Oct. 16, 2001, 2001 WL 29176126.
24. Id.
25. See Declan Walsh, Home News: President Refers to Historic Links Be-
tween Ireland and Uganda, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, 2001 WL 28827283;
Ugandan President Hails World Bank's Support, supra note 23 ("T]he World
Bank was impressed by Uganda's achievement in economic management and
the sustained levels of development.").
26. See Country Profile: Uganda, BBC NEs (July 26, 2001), at
http'//news.bbc.co.ukfhi/english/world/africa/country-profiles/newsid_106900
0/1069166.stm [hereinafter BBC NEWs].
27. See The World Factbook 2000, supra note 16.
28. Id.
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cused of resorting to coercive measures during elections.29
President Museveni himself is reported to have blatantly urged
Ugandans to vote for the chosen candidates from the NRM"
The Ugandan Constitution does not outright ban political
parties, but they are implicitly banned because they are prohib-
ited from public activities including campaigning and fund-
raising.31 Article 269 of the Constitution forbids political or-
ganizations from holding public rallies and from offering a plat-
form to campaign for or against a candidate for office. 32 Addi-
tionally, the Constitution outlaws "carrying on any activities
that may interfere with the movement political system for the
time being in force."33 This language is ambiguous because it
serves as a catch-all, encompassing practically any action
taken by a political organization, ostensibly prohibiting their
existence.
As the NRM has characterized itself as a "movement" and
not a political party, its leaders argue that it is exempt for the
regulations promulgated under Article 269."4 This assertion
has received much criticism and has prompted members of the
international community to characterize Uganda as a "one-
party" state, falling short of true democracy.35 There is an in-
creasing sense of frustration among Ugandans with Museveni's
version of democracy and the coercive power he exercises with
it. 36 Museveni defends his view, arguing that a multi-party
system encourages ethnic hatred. Increasingly fewer people
believe his argument, worrying about his apparent contempt
for the democratic process.38 In fact, a recent Internet poll on
the government of Uganda's website shows 59% of the 256 poll
29. See Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2.
30. See Katy Salmon, Museveni Foe Reelected to Another Term, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, June 27, 2001, 2001 WL 4804450.
31. See Seven Killed as Ugandans Vote in Parliamentary Elections, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, June 6, 2001 (on file with author).
32. UGANDA CONST. art. 269(c)-(d).
33. Id. art. 269(e).
34. Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Salmon, supra note 30.
38. Id.
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participants are in favor of an immediate return to multi-party
governance. 9
In June 2000 a national referendum was held on the political
system in Uganda. The vote appeared to overwhelmingly sup-
port the continuation of the current no-party system.
40
Museveni believes that the results of this referendum serve as
proof that Ugandans are happy with the NRM in power and
Article 269.41 Opponents question the legality of the referen-
dum and point out that less than 50% of the total electorate
actually voted.42
Members of the international community argue that the en-
tire concept of a referendum on the topic is inconsistent with
international law.4' The referendum would essentially be vot-
ing on the internationally recognized human rights of freedom
of association and assembly, which is incompatible with human
rights standards." Human rights are universal and cannot be
relinquished by a vote.45 Also, Human Rights Watch, a non-
governmental organization ("NGO"), argues that it would be
virtually impossible to have a fair vote on the topic as the NRM
has control of the government and access to state funding to
spread its message opposing political parties.46 Opposing or-
ganizations would not be allowed to take any action or access
any funding in support of their opinions under the rules prom-
ulgated by Article 269.47 In fact, Museveni and the NRM are
alleged to have mounted campaigns to encourage voting
against the multi-party system with such slogans as: "If you
39. Government of Uganda, Online Poll, at http'//government.go.ug (last
visited Mar. 1, 2002).
40. See People in Power: Uganda, CAMBRIDGE INT'L REFERENCE ON
CURRENT AFFAIRS, Sept. 19, 2001, 2001 WL 10618105; Uganda: Review,
AFRICA REvIEw WORLD OF INFO., Sept. 14, 2001, 2001 WL 26372417 (more
than 90% voted against allowing multiple political parties).
41. See People in Power: Uganda, supra note 40; Uganda: Review, supra
note 40.
42. See People in Power: Uganda, supra note 40; Uganda: Review, supra
note 40.
43. See Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2, § I.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. UGANDA CONsT. art. 269.
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elect Multi-Partyists insecurity is going to come back," and "we
liberated you." 8
C. Constitutional Provisions Relating to Women's Political Par-
ticipation
Despite the Constitution's continued shortcomings in politi-
cal organizing, Uganda has one of the more gender-equal Con-
stitutions with various provisions mandating the equal treat-
ment of women with men and the eradication of discrimina-
tion.49 It is this language that was enacted in keeping with the
ICCPR regulations and that this Note argues has not been fol-
lowed in practice.
First and foremost, the Constitution provides for equal
treatment of women with men," including participation in poli-
tics.5' It requires that "Women shall have the right to equal
treatment with men and that right shall include equal oppor-
tunities in political, economic and social activities." 2 The Con-
stitution further states that Uganda shall "provide the facilities
and opportunities necessary to enhance the welfare of women
to enable them to realise their full potential and advance-
ment."" It even requires the eradication of "laws, cultures, cus-
toms or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare or
interest of women or which undermine their status."54 Once it
is proven that a single-party system discriminates against
women, these statements support the implementation of a
multi-party system, which would enhance the welfare of
women and contribute to the realization of their full political
potential.
Additionally, in the section relating to the legislature, the
Constitution provides for affirmative action. It authorizes the
48. See Press Release, Foundation for African Development, Referendum
Message (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://www.uganda.co.ug/fad/
pressrelease.htm [hereinafter Press Release].
49. See generally Catherine Harries, Daughters of Our Peoples: Interna-
tional Feminism Meets Ugandan Law and Custom, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 493 (1994).
50. UGANDA CONST. art. 33.
51. Id.§4.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 33, § 2.
54. Id. § 6.
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election of one female Member of Parliament ("MP") for every
district.55 Women currently hold 17.8% of the seats in Parlia-
ment.56 Uganda cites the purpose for the affirmative action
provision as attempting to "redress the imbalances created by
history, tradition or custom."
57
Despite the establishment of this quota system for increasing
the amount of women elected to public office,58 the lack of po-
litical parties still mars this benefit. Additionally, the quota
system is often viewed as a tokenism meant to appease the in-
ternational community because of the use of selective recruit-
ment of women.59 In their selection of female candidates, the
party leaders are able to deliberately avoid women who hold
firm independent views in order to ensure that no threat to the
male control of the political machine arises.60 In the context of
one-party states in Eastern Europe, it appears that two objec-
tives are satisfied by establishing quotas: (1) to show that the
state is in favor of promoting women's participation; and (2) to
be sure that the seats are filled with "controllable" women.6
As one can imagine, the above, despite their limitations, are
still quite progressive, ambitious provisions for a new democ-
racy to have. Uganda has received great praise for the lengths
its Constitution has gone to, in an attempt to remedy the his-
torical discrimination and marginalization of its female popula-
tion.62 The problem arises when women are still hindered from
realizing their political pbtential by the lack of domestic im-
plementation and enforcement required to give meaning to
these provisions.
55. Id. art. 78, § 1.
56. See HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001, supra note 21, at 216.
57. UGANDA CONST. art. 33, § 5.
58. Id. art. 78.
59. See The Gender Question: Futility of Tokenism, AFRICA NEws, July 29,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Africa News Database.
60. Id.
61. See Ineke van Kessel, Is Democracy Good for Women: The Impact of
Democratic Transitions on the Representation of Women in the National
Parliaments of Southern Africa, Women on the Rise in Politics Lecture (Dec.
14, 1999), at http'l/www.niza.nl/uk/press/docs/womenonthe_rise/lec-
ture_vankessel.htm.
62. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Uganda, U.N. OHCHR, paras. 278-344, U.N.
Doc. A/50/38 (1995).
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D. Political Participation of Women in Uganda
Lack of political participation by women is pervasive across
Africa. The continent is rife with impediments to women real-
izing their full political potential, including rampant illiteracy,
lack of self-confidence, and societal attitudes towards women."
Uneducated women are intimidated by the voting process,
which they do not understand. Conversely, educated women
are disinterested in voting because they do not believe that
their vote is meaningful under a single-party system.' Rural
female populations find it difficult to gain access to the polling
sites, as they may be required to travel long distances" and
urban female populations are tired of Museveni's one-party
rhetoric.66 As voters, women feel useless, as they believe their
vote will only go to the NRMY The women of Uganda are enti-
tled to equal political access and a meaningful vote.
E. New Political Developments in Uganda
Currently before the Ugandan Parliament is the controver-
sial Political Organizations Bill ("POB").68 This is not the first
time the POB has come before the MPs. In fact, it had been
passed by Parliament in February 2001 and sent on to Presi-
dent Museveni for signature. Museveni rejected the POB,
sending it back to Parliament for reconsideration, saying: "Po-
litical organizations should not be allowed to operate at district
level and below until enough consensus has been generated on
this matter."69 If he is using the results of the June 2000 refer-
endum on the topic as the basis for his position, it can hardly
be considered determinative as there are numerous questions
63. See Rosemary Okello & Arthur Okwembah, Politics: Where Are All the
Young Women?, NATION (KENYA), May 5, 2000, 2000 WL 8703880.
64. See Salmon, supra note 30.
65. Amy S. Patterson, Women in Global Politics: Progress or Stagnation?,
USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 9015003.
66. See Salmon, supra note 30.
67. Id.
68. Human Rights Watch, Ugandan Parliament: Rights at Risk, at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/uganda0221.htm (Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Uganda Parliament: Rights at Risk].
69. See Ugandan President Rejects Political Bill 2001, XINHUA NEWS
SERVICE (April 19, 2001), at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/20010419/
399199.htm.
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surrounding the legitimacy of the referendum." Nevertheless,
despite Museveni's misgivings, the POB is far from liberal. It
would keep all existing restrictions in place, but allow political
organizations to open up branches at district level only.7'
As stated, the POB is again before Parliament awaiting re-
consideration. NGOs have decried the bill, arguing it, "seeks to
solidify the de facto one party system . . . and violates the
rights to freedom of assembly and association."72 Dr. Apollo
Milton Obote has sided with the NGOs against Museveni, call-
ing upon Ugandan MPs to block the POB. Dr. Obote, the exiled
former President of Uganda, argues that the POB, "seeks to
entrench President Yoweri Museveni's dictatorship."73 To allow
women an equal opportunity in government the strict opposi-
tion against political parties must be lifted.
III. AN ENTITLEMENT TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
As referred to in the introduction, an emerging right to de-
mocratic governance has been established within the interna-
tional legal community. Legal scholar Thomas Franck is cred-
ited with recognizing this right in his seminal 1992 article.74
The basis behind this theory, writes Franck, is that democratic
entitlement has become a "norm" in today's international sys-
tem.75 States seeking legitimacy on an international scale,
which is very important to budding democracies and new gov-
ernments, must conform to the international community's
norms and laws.76 In order to conform to these norms, the
states must govern with the consent of their people.77 This
method of governing places control largely in the hands of the
70. See Press Release, supra note 48.
71. See Ugandan President Rejects Political Bill 2001, supra note 69.
72. See Ugandan Parliament: Rights at Risk, supra note 68.
73. See Alex B. Atuhaire, Block Parties Bill, Obote Advises MPs, MONITOR
(KAMPALA) (Jan. 2, 2002), at http:J/allafrica.com/stories/200201020173.html.
It should be noted that Obote's hands are far from clean. Under his govern-
ment more that 100,000 lives were lost to human rights abuses and guerrilla
war. See The World Factbook 2000, supra note 16.
74. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Govern-
ance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 47.
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people, the hallmark of a true democracy."8 As explained below,
this norm of democratic entitlement has become international
law, thereby requiring states to conform to its principles.
Scholars interpret Franck as establishing that democracy is
"an internationally guaranteed human right, in respect of
which international procedures of monitoring and enforcement
are justified and, indeed, required."79 Franck finds the core of
the right to democratic entitlement in the right to "self-
determination," which the UN has declared in its Charter to be
a fundamental right and a basis on which to build "friendly
relations."0 The term "self-determination" has been given mul-
tiple meanings in international law, but Franck uses the term
as the right of people to determine their political destiny in a
democratic fashion.81 It entitles all people to "free, fair and
open participation in the democratic process of governance
freely chosen by each State."82 There have also been various
compilations of rights included in the entitlement to democratic
governance. The UN has recommended in a non-binding reso-
lution that the right to equal political access be included in the
right to political participation.83 As mentioned earlier, the the-
ory of democratic entitlement has evolved into well-established
international law. This entitlement is founded in part on cus-
tom and in part on the collective interpretation of treaties.8
78. Id. at 50.
79. Marks, supra note 7.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, § 2, interpreted by Franck, supra note 74, at 54.
The Charter does not contain a definition of self-determination. See generally
U.N. CHARTER.
81. See Franck, supra note 74, at 52. It is important to note that there is
no universally accepted definition of self-determination. Eric Ting-lun
Huang, The Evolution of the Concept of Self-Determination and the Right of
the People of Taiwan to Self-Determination, 14 N.Y. INTL L. REv. 167, 169
(2001). For the purposes of this Note, self-determination is used as Franck
describes it and not as its perhaps more common meaning regarding the right
of a people to create an independent state or achieve more autonomy within
an existing state. See Franck, supra note 74, at 52.
82. See Franck, supra note 74, at 59.
83. Promotion of the Right to Democracy, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/1999/57 (1999).
84. See Franck, supra note 74, at 47.
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A. The Customary Law Basis for Democratic Entitlement
Customary law provides one of the two bases for detertmining
that a democratic entitlement is part of international law. It
arises out of the practice of states, followed out of a sense of
legal obligation, or opinio juris.85 A few elements of the practice
of states include diplomatic instructions and other governmen-
tal acts and official statements of policy, whether they are uni-
lateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states. 6 Cus-
tomary law is generally more difficult to substantiate as there
is no clear, binding document signed by the parties involved, as
there is in the second category, treaty interpretation.
The Organization of American States ("OAS") stated in a
resolution that, "the solidarity of ... States and the high aims
which are sought through it require the political organization
of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of represen-
tative democracy."8 This statement would come under the
category of official statements of policy undertaken in coopera-
tion with other states and, therefore, is an example of custom-
ary law evincing a democratic entitlement. Additionally, the
UN Commission on Human Rights ("UNCHR") has recently
stated in a non-binding resolution that a right to democratic
governance exists. The resolution includes free voting proce-
dures, periodic and free elections and the right to equal access
to public service among the criteria for democratic govern-
ance.
89
The UN General Assembly ("UNGA") has also passed a reso-
lution in support of a democratic entitlement. The resolution
"[reaffirms the UNGA's] commitment to the process of democ-
ratization of States, and that democracy is based on the freely
expressed will of the people to determine their own political,
economic, social and cultural systems."" The resolution calls
upon states to encourage democracy by "promoting pluralism..
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102, cmts. b-c (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
86. Id. at cmt. b.
87. Id. at Introductory Note.
88. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti, OAS Official Rec.
OEA/Ser.FV.1/MRE/RES.1/91, at pmbl. (1991).
89. See Promotion of the Right to Democracy, supra note 83.
90. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 55th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (2001).
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. maximizing the participation of individuals in decision mak-
ing and the development of .. .an electoral system that en-
sures periodic, free and fair elections."91 In a conference on
gender and democracy, a UN Development Fund for Women
("UNIFEM") advisor also acknowledged a democratic entitle-
ment. He explained, "As a political idea democracy is premised
on the assumption that the people are both the subject and the
object of democratic governance. This means that the masses
of people should enjoy basic freedoms including those of asso-
ciation [and] speech."92
As evidence of a democratic entitlement involving Uganda it-
self, the outgoing United States Ambassador to Uganda said of
the 1996 elections that "nobody should deceive themselves that
these elections were free and fair in the sense that they met
international norms."93 The above are just a few of the many
examples evidencing that customary law exists in support of a
democratic entitlement. There is also a more overt basis dem-
onstrating the right: treaty law.
B. The Treaty Basis for Democratic Entitlement
Evidence of the international right to political participation
can also be found in, and derived from, concrete treaty lan-
guage and various UN documents.' A primary example of the
codification of this norm into international law can be found in
the ICCPR, to which Uganda is a signatory without reserva-
tions.95 Additional examples are found in other universal and
regional human rights documents, some of which will be dis-
cussed below.
91. Id.
92. Achola Pala Okeyo, Gender and Democracy: The Unfinished Agenda,
Paper Presented at the Third International Conference of the New Restored
Democracies on Democracy and Development (Sept. 1997), available at
http'/www.unifem.undp.org/gen&dem.htm.
93. Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2, § IX.
94. See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in Interna-
tional Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539, 552 (1992).
95. ICCPR, supra note 10 (ratified by Uganda June 21, 1995).
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1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR, which was ratified in 1966, is a treaty of para-
mount importance to the international community which sets
forth numerous provisions to ensure the enjoyment of civil and
political freedom for all people.96 As the ICCPR is a multilat-
eral treaty, the provisions contained therein are now consid-
ered codified into international law. As a rule, international
treaty terms are considered binding on the treaty's signato-
ries." Many treaties also contain enforcement provisions to
ensure compliance with the binding obligations of the treaty.
As evidence supporting a right to democratic entitlement, Ar-
ticle 25 of the ICCPR requires every state party to provide its
citizens with the opportunity to participate as voters and as
candidates in "genuine elections" which will demonstrate the
"free expression of the will of the electors."99
Uganda ratified the ICCPR, without reservations, in 1995 -
the same year its Constitution was completed. Under the
ICCPR, states parties are required to make laws and amend
their constitutions in accordance with the rights established in
the Treaty.1°° In establishing its Constitution, Uganda included
the necessary provisions to comply with the terms of the
ICCPR.10' Though not explicitly, the ICCPR implies further
requirements beyond the mere creation of laws. It seems to
demand actual implementation of the laws created. For exam-
ple, in an article specifically addressing gender inequality, the
ICCPR states: "The State Parties to the present Covenant un-
dertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the en-
joyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant." 2 Uganda has not taken this step. The laws are
established in its Constitution to comply with international law
created by the ICCPR, but Uganda does not follow through
96. Id. at pmbl.
97. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38, § 1(a), 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052, 1055.
98. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102.
99. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 25.
100. Id. art. 2, § 2.
101. See generally id.; UGANDA CoNsT.
102. ICCPR, supra note 10, art 3.
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with the actual implementation of ICCPR rights, thereby vio-
lating international law.
2. Other Examples of Codification of the Legal Theories on
Democracy
Other treaties in addition to the ICCPR substantiate the
claim that the legal theories on democracy have moved beyond
mere theory and into international law. Such treaties include
the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Con-
vention"),1 °3 The African Charter on Human and People's
Rights ("African Charter")0 and the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW,,). 1°5
The treaties to which Uganda is not a signatory, such as the
American Convention, can be seen as evidence of customary
international law.0 6 Customary international law results out
of the practice of states followed from a sense of legal obliga-
tion.0 7 This practice includes "diplomatic acts . . .and other
governmental acts and official statements of policy ... under-
taken in cooperation with other States," (i.e., treaties).0 8 A
multilateral treaty can show that an idea is widely accepted
and can contribute to the growth of customary law.' 9
The provisions in Article 23 of the American Convention are
almost identical to the language in Article 25 of the ICCPR,
which lends credence to the theory that the right to equal ac-
cess to political participation has become customary law."0 Ar-
ticle 23 states that every citizen has the right to "vote and to be
elected in genuine periodic elections . . .that [guarantee] the
free expression of the will of the voters.""'1 In interpreting this
103. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1114
U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
104. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 [hereinafter African Charter].
105. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
106. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102, cmt. i.
107. Id. § 102(2).
108. Id. at cmt. b.
109. Id. at cmt. i.
110. American Convention, supra note 103, art. 23.
111. Id.
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provision when reviewing a state party's election process, the
focus of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
("American Commission") has been on the issue of whether the
election is "authentic."" Section V.A. of this Note will discuss
what is meant by the term "authentic."
Additionally, the African Charter requires that states allow
each citizen the right to "freely participate in the government
of his country, either directly or through freely chosen repre-
sentatives."" This provision, found in Article 13, seems to im-
ply that the elections must be held without coercion or intimi-
dation by its use of "freely chosen."
4
Finally, the CEDAW obliges states parties to ensure that all
discrimination against women in both the political and public
spheres is eradicated."5 It naturally follows that this require-
ment would include the removal of all impediments to women's
equal access to political participation, including the existence of
a one-party system if it is proven to have a discriminatory ef-
fect on women.
IV. How UGANDA'S ONE-PARTY SYSTEM IS IN VIOLATION OF ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Uganda's One-Party System Violates International Law
A combined reading of the ICCPR and the various other in-
ternational documents setting forth the norm of democratic
entitlement creates the criteria for a free and fair election.
1 6
The elections cannot merely be used to lend authority to bor-
derline authoritarian regimes; instead they must create a com-
petitive process for the attainment of power."7 One of the key
aspects of a competitive process and a fair election is the allow-
ance of a multi-party system."" The structure of one-party
states can make it "difficult if not impossible, for independent
112. See Fox, supra note 94, at 566.
113. African Charter, supra note 104, art. 13.
114. Fox, supra note 94, at 568.
115. See CEDAW, supra note 105, art. 7.
116. See Fox, supra note 94, at 552.
117. See Richard R. Marcus et al., Popular Definitions of Democracy from
Uganda, Madagascar, and Florida, U.SA., J. ASIAN & AFR. STuD., Feb. 1,
2001, 2001 WL 25289658.
118. See Fox, supra note 94, at 560, 606.
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candidates to emerge on the electoral field.""' As stated above,
Uganda's no-party system can be interpreted to be a one-party
system and, therefore, clearly violates this criterion. It has
been said that "No one party regime in Africa can boast of de-
mocratic practice or a good record on human rights."'
Many international conventions also provide for the rights to
freedom of association and assembly. 2' As will be later dis-
cussed, these dual rights can been interpreted to demonstrate
that multi-party democracy is well established in international
law. The numerous provisions setting forth the rights to free-
dom of association and assembly, combined with interpreta-
tions on democratic entitlement, show that there is much in-
ternational support for the proposition that one-party systems
are not compatible with the right to democracy.
1. Customary Law Evidence that One-Party Systems Violate
International Law
Very few democratic states still operate under a one-party
system, with an increasing number of states changing to multi-
party systems in recent years. The move by many states from
a single-party system to a multi-party system serves as evi-
dence of customary law. Since very few states still have one-
party systems, a broad practice is shown. As the transition to
multi-party systems has followed various international docu-
ments with positions against single-party democracies, it can
be argued that the states' are acting out of a sense of obliga-
tion. This satisfies the two requirements for proving custom-
ary law.
22
Zambia, Tanzania, Lesotho and Malawi are all examples of
African nations that have made the move from single-party
119. Pierre A. Louis, "Obscure Despotism" and Human Rights in Togo, 23
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 133, 155 (1991/92).
120. Okechukwu Oko, Partition or Parish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in
Nigeria Through Reconfiguration, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 356
n.251 (1998) (quoting Peter Anyang' Nyong'o).
121. See African Charter, supra note 104, arts. 10-11; American Conven-
tion, supra note 103, arts. 15-16; ICCPR, supra note 10, arts. 21-22.
122. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102(2).
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systems to a multi-party system since 1990.'2 Partly in re-
sponse to demands by pro-democracy groups to end the one-
party rule in Zambia, the government amended the Constitu-
tion to allow formation of political parties.124 In neighboring
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("D.R.C."), the government of
Laurent Kabila recently proposed a constitution with strong
language in favor of multiple parties. Article 22 of the Consti-
tution states that "Political pluralism is recognized and guar-
anteed in the [D.R.C.] ."12' Article 23 goes on to provide that "No
one may impose a single party over all or part of the national
territory." 6 Following popular resentment manifesting itself
in the form of protests and riots, the West African state of Togo
adopted laws replacing its one-party system with a democratic
multi-party system. 27 It was believed that this step was neces-
sary to "entrench the democratic ideals in the Togolese political
culture."W
2 8
In addition to the individual cases discussed above, some of
the treaties discussed below are also evidence of customary
law. The treaties to which Uganda is not a signatory cannot be
binding on Uganda under treaty law, but can be binding under
customary law as they set forth examples of the practices of
states, followed out of a sense of legal obligation.
29
2. Treaty Law Evidence that One-Party Systems Violate Inter-
national Law
Several multilateral treaties have established the right to
freedom of association and freedom of assembly.
123. See MuNA NDULO, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA 41
(2000), available at http'//www.idea.intlideas work/22_s_africa/par-
ties_2_zambia.htm.
124. Id. at 48.
125. Timothy H. Edgar & Michael D. Nicoleau, Constitutional Governance
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Analysis of the Constitution Pro-
posed by the Government of Laurent Kabila, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 201, 217
(2000).
126. Id.
127. See Louis, supra note 119, at 140.
128. Id.
129. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102, cmts. b-c.
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The ICCPR provides for the right to freedom of association in
Article 22.13 Freedom of association should be read broadly
and is said to include the right to create and join political par-
ties. 3' The only qualification the ICCPR sets forth is that re-
strictions may be placed on this legal right when "prescribed by
law and. .. necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety."3 ' Museveni has argued that
the prohibition on political parties is necessary to prevent eth-
nic hatred, 3 but no evidence has been put forth showing his
concern to be an exercise of the interest of national security.
Like the right to freedom of association, the right to freedom
of assembly, created in Article 21 of the ICCPR, can be read to
require the allowance of political parties. Nothing is men-
tioned in the Article qualifying what form the assembly must
take, only that it must be peaceful.' As meetings of political
parties are generally peaceful gatherings, their rights should
be protected under Article 21.
The American Convention also provides for the rights of
freedom of assembly and freedom of association. Article 15
recognizes the right of peaceful assembly, but, like the ICCPR,
allows restrictions when dictated by national safety or public
security.'35 The same restriction is also in place in the Ameri-
can Convention's Article 16, which provides for the right to as-
sociate freely.'36
The African Charter, like the ICCPR and the American Con-
vention, provides for freedom of assembly'37 and association,
but goes on to create the right not to be "compelled to join an
association."3 8 An interesting caveat was added to subject the
right to the "obligation of solidarity provided for in Article
29.""" Article 29(4) gives the African individual the affirmative
130. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 22(1).
131. See Karl Joseph Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, Po-
litical Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 209, 235 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
132. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 22(2).
133. See Salmon, supra note 30.
134. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 21.
135. American Convention, supra note 103, art. 15.
136. Id. art. 16.
137. African Charter, supra note 104, art. 11.
138. Id. art. 10.
139. Id. at (2).
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duty to "preserve and strengthen social and national solidar-
ity."40 The NRM, as a national movement, could read this to
support its contention that political parties could disrupt
Uganda's national solidarity as all Ugandans are members of
the NRM. Clearly, this is not the case, as there are numerous
factions and frequent disharmony within the NRM.' Addi-
tionally, interpretations of the language in various treaties also
point to a conception of democracy that is inconsistent with a
one-party system. Interpretation by the UN and commissions
established under the treaties set forth a clear pattern evincing
that the drafters of the treaties did not intend a single-party
system to constitute a valid form of democracy.
From the language in Article 25 of the ICCPR, it is not clear
what is meant by the use of "genuine" and "free expression."
During the drafting process, one delegate defined "genuine" as
guaranteeing that all elections "faithfully reflected the opinion
of the population," but there does not appear to be any defini-
tion generally accepted by the drafters. Because one-party
states ratified the ICCPR, it can be argued that Article 25 does
not preclude one-party systems." But when this provision is
viewed in light of all the interpretations that have followed the
ICCPR and various subsequent human rights documents, it is
clear that single-party systems are contrary to the right to po-
litical participation.
Though the ICCPR makes no explicit statement requiring
multi-party elections, an argument can be made that a state
cannot have a "genuine election" without multiple parties on
the ballot.' The UN Human Rights Committee ("HRC") itself,
which oversees compliance of the ICCPR,'45 has questioned
whether one-party elections can ever truly be considered genu-
ine."'46 In a recent non-binding Resolution promoting democ-
140. Id. art. 29(4).
141. See Salmon, supra note 30.
142. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 16th Sess., 1096th mtg. at 179, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR1096 (1961).
143. See Fox, supra note 94, at 556.
144. See id. at 556-59.
145. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 40-41.
146. When reviewing country reports regarding compliance with the
ICCPR, one of the key aspects the HRC examines is whether a multi-party
democracy is in place. See Comments on Cameroon, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc.
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racy, the UNGA called upon members to develop and maintain
an electoral system that provides for the "free and fair expres-
sion of the people's will through genuine and periodic elec-
tions."'47 The Resolution goes on to include ensuring the "free-
dom to form democratic political parties that can participate in
elections . . . including through appropriate access under the
law to funds and free, independent and pluralistic media."'48
The American Commission recently had occasion to discuss
the role of one-party systems in democracies. While the Ameri-
can Commission's holdings are not per se binding on Uganda,
as it is not a party to the American Convention, the decisions
serve as further evidence of customary international law be-
cause they demonstrate the widespread acceptance of a prac-
tice by states. 4 9 Thus, as such, these obligations would be
binding on Uganda.
The American Commission has stated that political parties
are the foundation of modern democracy. 5 ' In past cases, the
American Commission has held that "parties are institutions
needed in democracy." 5' As stated previously, the focus of the
American Commission is on the authenticity of the election. In
cases where it has investigated the election practices of a state,
the American Commission has concerned itself with the restric-
tions a state places on political parties when determining au-
thenticity.'52 It has concluded that one-party states are inher-
ently coercive and no coercive political system can be authen-
tic. 1
53
Additionally, the European Commission on Human Rights
("ECHR") has held in a 1969 case that the abolition of political
parties violates Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European
CCPRIC/79/Add.33, $ 5 (1994); Comments on the United Republic of Tanza-
nia, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.12, $ 4 (1992).
147. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/55/96 (2001).
148. Id.
149. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102.
150. Annual Report 1994, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Rep. No. 1/95, Case 10.804(b), OEA/Ser.L.V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. at 49 (1995),
available at http://www.cidh.org.
151. Id.
152. See Fox, supra note 94, at 567 (interpreting the American Commis-
sion's statements in the Seventh Report on Cuba).
153. Id.
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms.M Article 3 mandates that states "hold free
elections ... under conditions which will ensure the free ex-
pression of the opinion of the people."'55 Again, Uganda is not
bound under treaty law by the decisions of the ECHR, but the
holdings are additional evidence of customary international
law, which is binding on Uganda.156
The African Charter, to which Uganda is a signatory and
therefore bound under treaty law, can also be said to support a
belief that a multi-party system is a requirement of a true de-
mocracy. If, as stated above, "freely chosen" implies without
coercion, then the African Charter also prohibits single-party
systems if such systems are impossible to exist without coer-
cion.'57 Although an argument can be made that the African
Charter does not believe one-party systems are inconsistent
with conducting "freely chosen" elections, such an argument is
ultimately unpersuasive. The argument that one-party sys-
tems are not inconsistent stems from the fact that many of the
signatories to the African Charter, including Uganda, exist un-
der one-party systems. Under such theory, it would seem
unlikely that parties would sign a treaty that conflicts with
their system of government. Moreover, the African Charter
leaves out the requirement that voting must reflect the opinion
of the people. This would also seem to support an argument
that one-party elections are permitted.'
However, this argument is countered by a reading of Article
60 of the African Charter, which instructs the African Commis-
sion on Human Rights ("African Commission") to "draw inspi-
ration from international law on human and peoples' rights."'5 9
International law clearly holds that single-party systems are at
odds with the democratic system and are, therefore, in viola-
tion of international law. While there is no outright prohibition
154. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EuR. CONy. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)
12.
155. Protocol (No. 1) to the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S.
262, 262.
156. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, § 102(2).
157. See Fox, supra note 94, at 102 (summarizing Cuba Report).
158. Id. at 568.
159. African Charter, supra note 104, art. 60.
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on single-party systems, making reference, without qualifica-
tion to international human rights law, seems to demonstrate
that the African Commission should base its evaluations on
common principles of international law. This concrete state-
ment is more persuasive than the fact that single-party states
signed the Charter.
The UN has also expressed its view that single-party elec-
tions hinder equal political access. 6 ' In its election manage-
ment capacity, the UN is able to work at a country level to pro-
vide voter education, review the electoral process and provide
general electoral assistance.' In reviewing elections, the UN
has made it clear that a standard for multi-party elections as a
prerequisite for a fair and free election has been established.62
This view is most clearly demonstrated in the United Nations
Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua
("ONUVEN"). 63  In the terms established by the UN, the
ONUVEN was obliged to ensure that political parties "enjoy
complete freedom of organization and mobilization, without
hindrance or intimidation by anyone." "
B. One-Party Systems Discriminate Against Women
The patriarchy evident in the sole political machine in
Uganda is a serious impediment to women's complete and real-
ized participation in politics. Women have been given the right
to participate in politics in the Constitution,'65 but the question
is not whether they have the right, but whether they are actu-
ally able to be active players within Ugandan politics.'66
160. Chiiko Bwalya v. Zambia, Comm. No. 314/1988, 6.6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993).
161. See United Nations Dev. Program, The Role of UNDP: Electoral
Management Bodies and Democratic Governance, at
http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/electoral/emb/EMB%20Discussions.htm (1999).
162. See Fox, supra note 94, at 590.
163. See Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genu-
ine Elections: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Agenda Item 98(b), at II.B.1, U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (1991).
164. Id. T 32.
165. UGANDA CONST. art 38.
166. See Judith Van Allen, Women's Rights Movements as a Measure of
African Democracy, J. AsIAN & AFR. STUD., Feb. 1, 2001, 2001 WL 25289655.
1160 [Vol. XXVII:3
DISCRIMINATION IN UGANDA
The one-party system in Uganda is a major hurdle for female
candidates to cross. Women are unable t6 start their own party
or even seek out an established party that may be more recep-
tive to their candidacy. By establishing a multi-party system
in Uganda, women could put forth their own slate of candidates
and mobilize to increase female voter turn out. There are nu-
merous non-governmental organizations and other states
throughout the world which have encouraged a multi-party
system to enhance the equality of political participation.'67 A
multi-party system benefits not only women, but the entire
state.
Naturally, universal agreement that multi-party democracies
are beneficial to women is lacking. Some Ugandan scholars
believe that multi-party elections may actually reverse some of
the progress women have made.'68 They maintain that estab-
lishment of a multi-party democracy would send women, who
had just begun to compete in Uganda's current single-party
system, scrambling to understand the new system. It has been
argued that the shallow progress that women have made de-
pends on the continuation of the stable institutional networks
of the single-party system."9
There are several examples that run contrary to the argu-
ment that transformation from a one-party system to a multi-
party system will be detrimental to women. The Washington
Post reported that "The multi-party movement that gripped
Africa during the late 1980's and early 1990's has galvanized
women across the continent, leading to a bevy of political
groups and spurring hundreds of women to run for office.""
For example, following the switch to a multi-party system,
167. See Democracy in Africa: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm. Subcomm. on Africa, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Susan E. Rice,
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. State Department).
168. See Harries, supra note 49, at 522 (taken from conversations with
Enid Byaburakirya, Director, Legal Aid Project of the Uganda Law Society,
in Kampala, Uganda (June 23, 1992)).
169. Id.
170. Stephen Buckley, Africa's Women Make Power Moves; Female Officials
FightHostility to Break Grip of All-Male Rule, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1995, at
Al, available at 1995 WL 2080786.
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women in Kenya won fifty local political posts, doubling the
positions they previously held. 7'
Additionally, the political status of women in Zambia defies
the reasoning against multi-party democracy.'72 Since the
movement from one-party rule to multi-party democracy,
women have begun to seek out political participation and in-
creased representation. A new party was established which
sought the input of women and encouraged professional women
to join. Numerous women obtained seats as chairpersons of
committees of the party.'73
Furthermore, women in Botswana were able to use the
multi-party system to their advantage in order to gain more
rights. 74 When the majority party, which had dominated poli-
tics since Botswana gained independence, failed to respond to
requests and pressure from women to improve their rights and
freedoms, women turned to an opposition party where they
found a commitment to women's rights and representation.'
The women voted en masse in favor of the other party, demon-
strating their electoral power. 76 Their success illustrates that
the existence of legitimate other parties in an election provides
women with the leverage to get some of their goals accom-
plished and serves as a warning to the dominant party to be
more responsive to women's rights.
7
Based on these theories, Uganda fails its requirement to
comply with the international norm of democratic entitlement
and the equal rights provisions in its own Constitution. The
norm of democratic entitlement has become international law
through customary law and various international agreements.
With women as a whole unable to participate effectively in the
political process, they lack the right to self-determination,
which is the core of democratic entitlement, and violates inter-
national law. This right, and the constitutional provisions es-
171. Id.
172. See Gisela Geisler, Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in South-
ern Africa, Case Studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, Oct. 1, 1995, 1995 WL 14760132.
173. Id.
174. See Van Allen, supra note 166.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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tablished to codify it into Ugandan domestic law, needs to be
enforced in order for the provisions to be effective.
V. HOW TO ENFORCE THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PRovIsIoNs
A common critique of international law is the lack of effective
enforcement.178 The enforcement of international law requiring
equal political participation may require a state to restructure
its government or laws.79 The ICCPR has set forth a system of
enforcement. In addition, there are various steps nations can
take to attempt to induce compliance by a state violating inter-
national law. Finally, suit can be brought in the Ugandan do-
mestic courts.
A. The ICCPR's Enforcement Mechanisms
The ICCPR has set forth various provisions to ensure com-
pliance with the rights it has established. The first of the three
enforcement provisions is found in Article 40 of the ICCPR.
Article 40 requires states parties to submit reports to the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations on the "measures they
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized [in the Cove-
nant] and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those
rights."8 ' The second provision is found in Article 41. It per-
mits state parties, who believe that another state party is not
"giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant," to first
bring the matter to the attention of that state party.'8' If com-
munication between the two states does not end in a result sat-
isfactory to both parties, the state has the right to refer the
matter to the HRC' 8' established by the ICCPR."8' Acceptance
of this enforcement mechanism is optional and may be accepted
at any time.'8
An optional third provision attached in a protocol to the
ICCPR provides for communications to the HRC by "individu-
als claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set
178. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 85, at Introductory Note.
179. See Fox, supra note 94, at 596.
180. ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 40, § 1.
181. Id. art. 41, § 1(a).
182. Id. art. 41, § 1(b).
183. Id. art. 28, § 1.
184. Id. art. 41, § 1.
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forth in the Covenant."8 ' There are qualifications to this al-
lowance, such as the exhaustion of all available domestic reme-
dies before bringing a communication to the HRC.86
B. Additional International Enforcement Options
As noted earlier, states depend on international recognition
to establish their legitimacy as a government. If the actions of
a state are repugnant to other states and in violation of inter-
national law, the offending state can be shunned and exiled.
These states would ostensibly become pariahs.87 A perfect ex-
ample of this situation is the apartheid government of South
Africa. Its system of white-rule government was deemed ille-
gitimate and practically every state scorned South Africa's gov-
ernment, inducing reform.'88 This might be the best mecha-
nism for enforcing Uganda's violation of international law.
Human Rights Watch agrees, stating that "It is unlikely that
the initiative for democratic reform will come from inside the
NRM-dominated government without significant international
pressure.""9
C. Domestic Enforcement Options
Women in Uganda who feel that the government is not abid-
ing by its international obligations are also entitled to bring
suit in Ugandan courts. There have been several successful
cases where women have used international obligations to put
an end to discrimination in various contexts.9 ' For example,
Unity Dow, a lawyer in Botswana, sued in Botswana's domestic
court arguing that the traditional law establishing different
citizenship rules for children of citizen women than citizen men
was impermissibly discriminatory. 9' She claimed the law vio-
185. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
186. Id. art. 5, § 2.
187. See Fox, supra note 94, at 596-97.
188. Id.
189. Hostile to Democracy, supra note 2.
190. See Ephrahim v. Pastory and Another, Tanz. High Ct. (Feb. 22, 1990);
Attorney Gen. v. Unity Dow, C.A. of the Rep. of Bots. (July 3, 1992) (opinion
of Ammissah, J.P.), available at http'//www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/
fulltext/dowl.pdf.
191. See Unity Dow, C.A., at 160.
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lated provisions of the Botswana Constitution, citing Bot-
swana's international obligations under human rights law as
guidelines for interpreting the domestic constitutional provi-
sions. The court found the law discriminatory, holding that
"the Constitution must be held not to permit discrimination on
the grounds of sex which will be a breach of international
law.- '
Women in Uganda could take this same action. The plain-
tiffs could argue that the one-party system impermissibly vio-
lates the Uganda Constitution and its obligations under inter-
national law, citing Article 33 of the Constitution and all of the
international obligations the state has assumed as signatory to
multilateral conventions.93
VI. CONCLUSION
Establishment of a multi-party system is not a cure-all for
Uganda's ills. There are many additional hurdles that will
arise under a system that allows political ch oice, but allowing a
multi-party system will be a large step in the right direction
towards eradicating the inequalities which prevent women
from properly exercising their political rights.
Let it not be said that Uganda has failed to take monumental
steps in improving human rights for its people.'9 On the con-
trary, by African standards, Uganda is viewed as relatively
progressive.195 The advances in human rights in general in-
clude extensive provisions for the rights of women. Democracy
is an ever-evolving process and now that Uganda has estab-
lished a democracy, further movement can be made to equalize
the rights of men and women by utilizing the channels created
by the Constitution in compliance with Uganda's obligations
under international law. But for this to happen, the constitu-
tional provisions must be given full effect. If the equal rights
provisions are not implemented, they are meaningless.
It is women as key decision-makers who have the ability to
make drastic changes and improvements for themselves and
192. Id. at 170.
193. UGANDA CONST. art. 33.
194. See BBC NEWS, supra note 26.
195. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women: Uganda, supra note 62.
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their nation on the whole.'96 To accomplish this, the democratic
provisions established in Uganda's Constitution must be ob-
served. The guaranteed administration of the laws established
will give meaning to the international legal principles behind
them.197 The administration begins with women being allowed
equal political participation, not only under the law, but in
practice as well.
Political parties play an essential role in the democratic po-
litical process 9  For women to achieve true access to the de-
mocratic process, a multi-party system must be permitted to
allow women to organize and mobilize. These advances will
give women the right to equal political participation, which is
their entitlement. In the words of John Stuart Mills, "Only
complete equality between all men and women in legal, politi-
cal and social arrangements can create the proper conditions
for human freedom and a democratic way of life."'99
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196. See Rice, supra note 167.
197. See Stacy R. Sandusky, Women's Political Participation in Developing
and Democratizing Countries: Focus on Zimbabwe, 5 BUFF. Hum. RTS. L. REV.
253, 262 (1999).
198. See NDULO, supra note 123.
199. JOHN STUART MILLS, THE SUBJUDICATION OF WOMEN (1869), quoted in
NDULO, supra note 123, at 54.
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